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ABSTRACT
Job security provisions are widely believed to reduce dismissals and hiring. In addition, in
developing countries job security is believed to reduce compliance with labor regulations and to
increase informal activity. Reductions in dismissal costs are, thus, often advocated as a way to
increase labor market flexibility and to increase compliance with labor regulations. This paper
analyzes the impact of a substantial reduction in dismissal costs introduced by the Colombian Labor
Market Reform of 1990. A theoretical model illustrates the effect of dismissal costs when there is
a noncompliant sector. The model shows the direct effect of a reduction in dismissal costs on
increased turnover as well as the second order effects on wages and on the composition of the
compliant and noncompliant sectors. Using microdata from the Colombian National Household
Surveys, I exploit the temporal variability in dismissal costs together with the variability in coverage
between formal and informal workers (who are not covered and were, thus, not directly affected by
the reform). The differences-in-differences results indicate increased separations and accessions for
formal workers relative to informal workers after the reform. Moreover, the increase in worker
turnover was greatest among younger workers, more educated workers, and workers employed in
larger firms who are most likely to have been affected by the reform. The estimates, together with
the steady-state conditions of the model, suggest the reform contributed to 10% of the reduction in
unemployment during the period of study.
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Job security regulations are usually considered to inhibit labor market flexibility by 
reducing the ability of firms to hire and fire workers.  While severance pay and other job security 
provisions admittedly protect workers from unjust termination, these laws may also adversely 
affect workers by reducing their ability to find new jobs.  State-mandated severance pay and job 
security requirements are equivalent to taxes on job destruction that reduce firms’ incentives not 
only to dismiss but also to hire new workers.  In fact, it has often been suggested that the 
elevated severance pay and job security requirements in Europe are in part to blame for the high 
unemployment levels in this continent. 
The perception that reducing firing costs would help to reduce unemployment by 
enhancing labor market flexibility, through increased worker turnover into and out of 
unemployment, has driven several European countries to introduce labor market reforms in this 
direction.  In particular, a number of countries including, England, France, Germany, and Spain, 
introduced temporary contracts during the 1980’s as a way of reducing severance payments and 
payments for unjust dismissals.  In contrast, American labor markets became more rigid during 
the 1980’s.  During this decade, a number of states in the U.S. introduced indemnities for unjust 
dismissals, thus, creating exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Although the evidence on the effects of these legislative changes on employment and 
unemployment in Europe and the U.S. has been ambiguous, reforms to reduce labor market 
rigidities have also been advocated and implemented in a number of less developed countries.  In 
less developed countries the effects of these reforms are considered to be even greater, as labor 
market regulations are considered not only to discourage hiring and firing, but in addition to 
encourage noncompliance with labor legislation and the expansion of the informal sector.   3
In this paper, I consider the incidence of a substantial reduction of firing costs on 
flexibility and unemployment in a less developed country.  In particular, this paper studies the 
impact of the Colombian labor market reform of 1990, which reduced severance payments 
substantially, on worker flows into and out of unemployment and its implied net effect on 
unemployment.  I use a micro-level data set from Colombia to examine the effects of a reduction 
in firing costs on worker turnover.  The labor market reform introduced in Colombia in 1990 
reduced severance payments for all workers hired after 1990 and covered by the legislation 
(formal sector workers).  Informal workers, who are not covered by the legislation, were not 
directly affected by the reform and, thus, are used as a comparison group in the estimations.  The 
empirical analysis exploits this variability in the coverage of the legislation between formal and 
informal sector workers together with the temporal change in the Colombian legislation to 
identify the effects of a reduction in firing costs on the exit rates out of employment and out of 
unemployment.  The Colombian Household Surveys for June provide information about formal 
and informal sector activity and allow estimating hazard rates for formal and informal workers, 
before and after the reform.  The results of the hazard models using a differences-in-differences 
estimator indicate that hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform for 
formal sector workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered).  
Moreover, the increase in worker turnover was greater among younger more educated workers 
employed in larger firms who are likely to have been affected most by the changes in the 
legislation. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, I survey the evidence on the 
effect of firing costs on employment volatility, the speed of employment adjustment, and 
employment levels, labor market participation, and unemployment for developed countries.  In   4
Section III, I describe the legislative changes, introduced by the Colombian labor market reform 
of 1990 that led to a reduction in severance pay and other firing costs.  In section IV, I develop a 
matching model with endogenous sorting into a formal and an informal sector. The model is 
useful as it predicts the direct effect of a reduction in severance pay on worker turnover as well 
as the general equilibrium effects of the reform on turnover in the two sectors.  Section V 
discusses the identification strategy of the firing cost effects on worker turnover.  In Section VI, I 
describe the data and present the results on the incidence of firing costs on the exit rates into and 
out of unemployment.  In Section VII, I use the steady-state condition from the model together 
with the results in Section VI to estimate the net impact of the reform on unemployment. Section 
VIII concludes. 
II. Review of the Literature 
The perception that flexible labor markets promote employment and reduce 
unemployment is widely accepted.  Yet, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the net effects 
of firing costs on employment and unemployment are ambiguous.   
Past theoretical work on the effects of firing costs shows that while reductions (increases) 
in firing costs are expected to increase (reduce) hiring and firing as well as employment 
volatility, the net effects of reductions in firing costs on employment and unemployment are 
ambiguous.  Theoretically, the net effect of firing costs on employment is very sensitive to the 
assumptions of the model.  The net effect of firing costs on employment depends crucially on 
whether the entry-exit margin is considered and on the stochastic process assumed to be 
generating the demand shocks.  Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) simulate the effect of firing 
costs in a general equilibrium framework with firm entry and exit and they find that an increase 
in firing costs reduces employment.  On the contrary, Bentolila and Bertola (1990) consider a   5
partial equilibrium model with a monopolistic firm and find that employment increases slightly 
with firing costs, because the firing effect dominates the hiring effect.  In addition, Bentolila and 
Dolado (1994) argue that in an insider-outsider model a-lá Lindbeck and Snower (1988), firing 
costs may strengthen the position of insiders and increase their employment while reducing the 
employment of outsiders. 
Similarly, past empirical evidence indicates that lower firing costs are related to greater 
employment volatility, but the evidence of the net effect of firing costs on employment and 
unemployment in these studies has been mixed.  Bertola (1990) constructs job security indices 
for ten countries and finds that job security provisions are negatively correlated with the variance 
of employment and with unemployment’s response to output changes (i.e., Okun’s coefficient).  
Using a panel of retail firms in the U.S., Anderson (1993) finds that the seasonal variability in 
employment is lower in firms facing higher adjustment costs.  Moreover, a number of studies 
have related the speed of employment adjustment to shocks to the level of firing costs.  As 
predicted by the theory, Anderson (1993) finds that the probability of responding to shocks is 
negatively correlated to the adjustment costs faced by firms.  In addition, Hamermesh (1993) 
finds that the speed of employment adjustment to shocks fell in non-unionized industries over 
the 1980’s in the U.S., when exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine were being 
introduced.  Using British data Burgess (1993) finds a lower speed of employment in industries 
subject to higher firing costs.  Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) also find that employment 
adjustments over the business cycle increased in Spain after the introduction of temporary 
contracts in 1984.  Thus, these studies provide evidence of the greater employment volatility 
when firing costs are lower. 
The evidence on the impact of firing costs on employment and unemployment, however,   6
appear mixed.  Lazear (1990) uses cross-country data from 22 developed countries over 29 years 
and finds evidence suggesting that high severance payments and advance notice requirements 
reduce employment and labor force participation.  Grubb and Wells (1993) construct job security 
indices for OECD countries and also find a negative correlation between job security and 
employment.  Di Tella and MacCulloch (2004) use a measure of flexibility provided by 
employers and they find that flexibility is positively correlated with employment and 
participation, and to a lesser degree with unemployment.  In contrast, Bertola (1990) finds 
evidence suggesting that job security provisions are unrelated to medium and long run 
employment.  Nickell and Layard (1999) find that employment and labor force levels are lower 
when employment protection legislation (EPL) is stricter, but since they are exploiting cross-
country variation they cannot control for the fact that female labor force participation is lower 
and EPL stricter in Southern European countries.  In fact, they find that the results disappear 
when considering a sample of adult males. The OECD’s Employment Outlook (1999) exploits 
additional temporal variation in EPL and finds no effect of EPL on aggregate employment. 
However, consistent with the story that EPL protects insiders, the Employment Outlook finds 
that EPL increases the employment of adult men and reduces the employment of young workers 
and women.  
Exploiting the temporal change in the labor legislation across states in the U.S., 
Dertouzos and Karoly (1993) find employment levels fell in states that introduced more stringent 
employment protection.  In contrast, Miles (2000) finds no effect of the changes in unjust 
dismissal costs in the U.S. on aggregate employment.  However, both Autor (2003) and Miles 
(2000) find that stricter employment protection contributed to the rise in temporary employment 
in the U.S. over the 1980’s.  Anderson (1993), instead, exploits the experience-rating feature of   7
the U.S. unemployment insurance system to quantify adjustment costs and finds higher average 
employment in firms subject to higher adjustment costs.  The mixed results observed in the 
literature are not surprising if one considers that cross-section studies are subject to omitted 
variable biases, simultaneity problems, and endogeneity of the legislation.  The panel studies 
while mitigating the concerns of omitted variable biases and simultaneity are subject to the 
possibility of endogeneity of the legislation as well as to selection biases. Thus, while the 
evidence on the effects of firing costs on the volatility of employment appears robust, the net 
effect of firing costs on employment and unemployment is not as clear.
1 
More recently, a handful of studies have exploited the differential variation in labor 
legislation for certain groups of workers to set up natural experiments of the impact of firing 
costs using microdata.  While Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find no effect of the American with 
Disabilities Act on separations of disabled relative non-disabled, Oyer and Schaefer (2000) find 
substitution of individual dismissals for mass layoffs after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1990 for groups covered by the legislation.  Kugler and Saint-Paul (2003) and Autor, Donohue 
and Schwab (2003) find increased hires and employment in those states that introduced certain 
unjust dismissal provisions over the 1980’s.  Finally, Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) find 
increased hiring of young workers and increased separations of older workers after the 
introduction of the Spanish labor market reform of 1997, which reduced dismissal costs and 
payroll taxes for these groups of workers. 
While micro studies solve some of the problems in studies relying on macrodata, these 
studies have focused on the impact of firing costs in developed countries.  There is little 
                                                           
1 However, a number of recent studies, including Angrist and Kugler (2003), Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2003), and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
find that the negative effects of labor market institutions on employment and unemployment are realized when economies are faced with bad 
shocks.   8
evidence on the impact of firing costs in less developed countries.   In the next section, I describe 
the legislative change introduced in Colombia in 1990, which allows to exploit the temporal 
variability and the variability in coverage of labor legislation to estimate the impact of firing 
costs on turnover and unemployment in a less developed country. 
III. Changes in the Colombian Institutional Framework 
In 1990, Colombia introduced a labor market reform that substantially reduced the costs 
of dismissing workers.  The Colombian reform reduced severance payments, widened the 
definition of ‘just’ dismissals, extended the use of temporary contracts, and speeded up the 
process of mass dismissals.  All of these policy changes reduced the costs of firing workers 
covered by the legislation after 1990.
2  The reform, thus, reduced firing costs for firms in the 
formal sector but not for informal firms, which did not comply with labor legislation.  
Although the reform introduced various legislative changes simultaneously, the one 
major policy change that decreased the costs of dismissals was the reduction of severance 
payments.
3  The reform reduced the severance paid for dismissals in three ways.  First, prior to 
the reform, employers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year worked based on 
the salary at the time of separation.  After the reform, employers were, instead, required to 
deposit a monthly contribution equivalent to one month of the yearly salary at that moment in 
time to an individual severance payments savings account (“Fondo de Cesantías”), which would 
be accessible to workers in the event of separation. Thus, total severance payments were reduced 
because the monthly payment per year worked was no longer based on the higher salary at the 
                                                           
2 In addition to the Labor Market Reform of 1990, a social security reform was passed in 1994 and implemented in 1995 and 1996.   However, 
since the social security reform increased payroll taxes, the increase in non-wage recurrent costs of this reform implies different effects on 
turnover than the reduction in dismissal costs of the Labor Market Reform of 1990.  Moreover, the study by Gruber (1997) of a similar reform in 
Chile finds no effects of payroll taxes on employment because recurrent costs are passed onto wages.   
3 Note that both before and after the reform, employers were exempt from the payment of severance in cases when employees were dismissed 
because of undue care, sabotage, or release of employers’ proprietary information.   9
time of separation, but rather on the salary during each month.  Second, prior to the reform, 
workers could obtain advance payments from their severance to use for investments in education 
and housing, that would only be credited to the employer in nominal terms in the event of 
separation.  After the reform, although the withdrawal of funds was still permitted, these ‘loans’ 
were now credited to the employer in real terms.  According to Ocampo (1987), the fact that, 
prior to the reform, withdrawals were credited to the employer in nominal terms implied, on 
average, a cost of 35% of the total severance payments in the manufacturing sector prior to 1990. 
  Finally, the change in the legislation reduced severance pay, because the introduction of 
guaranteed severance payments essentially turned severance payments into a deferred 
compensation scheme, allowing workers lower wages in exchange for future severance.
4  Not all 
workers were, however, affected in the same way by the reduction in severance payments.  As 
indicated above, workers hired by informal firms are not covered by the legislation and, thus, 
should not had been affected directly by the reform.  Moreover, family workers, temporary 
workers, and workers employed by firms with 5 or less employees are not entitled to severance 
payments, and domestic workers and workers employed by firms with very little capital are 
entitled only to a severance payment of 15 days per year worked. 
A second important change introduced by the reform was the change in the legislation 
with regards to indemnities for ‘unjust’ dismissals.  First, the definition of ‘unjust’ dismissals 
changed in 1990.  Prior to the reform, ‘just’ cause dismissals included dismissals of employees 
because of fraud, violence, undue care, sabotage, discipline problems, deficient performance, and 
release of proprietary information.  After the reform, the definition of ‘just’ cause dismissals was 
extended to include any dismissal for failure to comply with firm regulations and instructions 
                                                           
4 Kugler (2002) studies the impact a change from a standard severance payments system into a system of severance payments savings accounts.   10
from one’s supervisors.  The exemptions for the payment of indemnities for ‘unjust’ dismissals 
were thus extended after the 1990 reform, reducing firing costs for formal firms.  Second, the 
reform eliminated the ability of workers with more than ten years of tenure to sue for backpay 
and reinstatement.  At the same time, however, the reform increased the cost of ‘unjustly’ 
dismissing workers with more than ten years of tenure (see Table 1) and this may have increased 
the incentives for firms to dismiss workers just before reaching 10 years of seniority.
5  Thus, 
these changes in ‘unjust’ dismissal legislation can be expected to have the greatest impact on 
formal workers with intermediate levels of seniority. 
Another important change brought about by the reform was the extension of the use of 
fixed-term contracts.
6  Prior to 1990, fixed term-contracts were allowed for a minimum duration 
of a year.
7  After the reform, these fixed-term contracts were extended to contracts of less than a 
year (renewable up to three times). This change in the legislation, thus, lowered firing costs for 
firms hiring workers for less than a year and would be expected to have increased turnover 
among formal workers with less than a year of tenure after the reform. 
An additional change introduced by the reform was a reduction in the advance notice for 
mass dismissals.  While advance notice requirements for mass layoffs existed prior to the reform 
(see Table 2), the reform introduced penalties to bureaucrats who did not process requests for 
mass layoffs quickly.  If such threats to bureaucrats were effective, this change in the legislation 
should have speeded up the dismissal process for formal firms and lowered their costs of firing. 
Finally, the reform also introduced a new type of contract that eliminated severance 
                                                           
5 Note, however, that employees with more than ten years of experience hired before 1990 could also choose to be covered by the new regime 
with Severance Payments Savings Accounts. 
6 While temporary contracts are subject to payroll taxes and social security contributions, these contracts are not subject to severance pay and 
‘unjust’ dismissal legislation as long as contracts end by the agreed date. 
7 Despite legislation on fixed-term contracts, however, firms could circumvent this restriction by subcontracting workers from temp agencies even 
prior to the reform.   11
payments altogether.  This type of contract (“Salario Integral”) allowed formal workers who 
earned more than ten times the minimum wage to opt out of severance payments, indemnities for 
unjust dismissals, benefits (except paid vacations), social security contributions, and payroll 
taxes in exchange for a higher salary.  The introduction of this type of contract effectively 
allowed firms to eliminate the cost of dismissing highly paid workers who opted for the “Salario 
Integral”.  Thus, one would expect to find a greater effect of the reform on formal sector workers 
with salaries above ten minimum wages.
8 
The changes in severance pay legislation, ‘unjust’ dismissal legislation, temporary 
contracts, and mandatory advance notice introduced by the Colombian Labor Market Reform 
should have directly reduced the costs of dismissals for formal firms and increased turnover in 
the formal sector.  Moreover, it is often argued that job security regulations simply encourage the 
expansion of the informal sector and one would, thus, expect for this type of reform to have 
encouraged greater compliance with the legislation.  The next section introduces a matching 
model with firing costs, which shows the direct effect on formal turnover of a reduction in firing 
costs as well as the indirect effects on formal and informal turnover through the compositional 
changes of firms in each sector.  The model shows that a reform that reduces dismissal costs may 
not only increase turnover, but it may also increase compliance with state-mandated firing costs. 
IV. A Sorting Model of Compliance with Job Security Provisions 
  This section presents a matching model with a formal sector and an informal sector in 
which firms sort themselves between the two sectors.  Firms producing in the formal sector must 
comply with labor legislation and have to pay state-mandated severance in the event of a 
                                                           
8 By 1994 only 1.5% of all workers in manufacturing and 0.6% of workers in commerce had opted for this type of contract (Lora and Henao, 
1995).  Since the surveys used in the analysis do not indicate whether a worker indeed opted for an Integral Salary, we examine whether the 
impact of the reform was greater on older and highly educated workers who are more likely to earn above ten minimum wages.   12
dismissal, while firms in the informal sector do not comply with job security legislation and 
avoid the severance payment.  Productivity in the informal sector is, however, lower overall than 
in the formal sector because informal firms must produce at a smaller scale to remain 
inconspicuous to the authorities.  Moreover, the presence of a firm-specific component to 
productivity in the model implies that, in equilibrium, firms with higher idiosyncratic 
productivity self-sort into the formal sector while firms with lower idiosyncratic productivity 
self-sort into the informal sector. 
  The model predicts that the probability of being dismissed by a formal firm is lower 
because of the legislated severance payments, but also because formal firms are more productive. 
Also, a reduction in severance payments increases the probability of dismissals in the formal 
sector through a direct effect on the firing costs.  In addition, however, the reduction in firing 
costs has effects on the idiosyncratic composition of firms in each sector as well as on the wages 
paid in each sector.  This model, thus, highlights the potential biases that may arise in empirical 
studies that attempt to quantify the effects of firing costs. 
A.  Assumptions 
In this model, heterogeneous firms may choose to produce in a formal sector in which 
they must comply with job security provisions or to produce in the informal sector without 
complying but at the cost of lower productivity.  Workers are identical ex−ante, but they may 
have different productivity ex-post depending on how well they match.  After a match, the firm 
and worker set the wage according to a Nash-bargaining solution.  Then, the firm decides 
whether to keep or dismiss the worker. 
Production in Each Sector 
  Formal and informal production is a function of a sector-specific component, as, of a   13
firm-idiosyncratic component, A, and of the match-quality component, γ, and produce with a 
technology, Ys = asγA, for s = F, I.  Sector-specific productivity is fixed and it is assumed, 
without loss of generality, that aF = 1 > aI = a.  The firm-idiosyncratic component comes from a 
distribution F(A), and the match-quality component comes from a distribution G(γ). 
Timing 
  Firms, first, observe their firm-specific productivity.  Firms then choose a sector given 
the productivity in the sector and their known firm-specific productivity.  Formal and informal 
firms hire in the same market and, immediately after hiring, they observe the match-specific 
productivity.  Then, firms and workers bargain over wages.  At the end of the process firms 
decide whether to keep or dismiss the worker, and formal firms that do dismiss must provide a 
severance payment, C.  However, workers may still be separated afterwards at arrival rates, λF 
and λI, due to exogenous reasons, in which case firms do not pay severance. 
Matching 
  All firms and workers search in the same market.  The arrival rate of applicants to formal 
and informal firms is the same, q(θ) = m(1/θ,1), where θ = v/u.  The arrival rate of job 
opportunities is θq(θ), and workers receive offers from formal or informal firms with a given 
probability that depends on the share of firms in each sector. 
Wage-setting 
  Each firm and worker pair sets the wage based on Nash bargaining.  Wages are set after 
firm-specific and match-specific productivities are observed.  In this model, all wages are 
affected by job security legislation, because the severance pay raises the utility of the   14
unemployed and thus raises the reservation wage of all workers.
9 
B.  Solution to the Model 
The model is solved by backward induction.  First, the solution for the dismissal choices in 
each sector is found.  Second, the Nash-bargaining solution of the wage is determined.  Finally, 
the marginal firm between the two sectors is determined to solve for the split of firms between 
the formal and informal sectors. 
Dismissal Decisions 
  The present discounted profits for a firm with a filled job is Js and the present discounted 
value of a vacant job is Vs, for s = F,I (formal and informal, respectively).  Thus, the asset 
equation of a filled and a vacant job are given by the following equations, respectively: 
r Js = Ys – ws + λs ( Vs – Js ), 
r Vs = q(θ) ( Js – Vs ), 
As there is free-entry, and all profit-opportunities are exploited, Vs = 0.  Thus, 
Js = [asγA - ws ] / ( r + λs + q(θ) ). 
Once matched, a firm must choose whether to keep or dismiss a worker.  A formal firm has to 
pay a cost, C, if it decides to dismiss, while an informal firm does not have to pay the firing cost. 
Thus, the minimum match-productivity that triggers a dismissal by a formal firm is given by, 
 γF = [ wF - C ( r + λF + q(θ) ) ] / A . 
For informal firms, the trigger productivity is given by, 
γI = [ wI ] / aA . 
                                                           
9 As pointed out by Lazear (1990), in a perfectly competitive market, the state-mandated severance pay could be undone given the proper 
contract.  In particular, the worker would have to post a bond for the cost of the severance pay to the firm upon the signing of the contract.  
However, as in Lazear (1990), it is assumed that the state-mandated severance pay is not completely offset by a private transfer, because workers 
may be liquidity constrained and because of moral hazard problems on the part of firms.  
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Given firm-specific productivity and wages, the probability that a formal firm dismisses a 
worker is less than the probability that an informal firm dismisses, i.e.,γF < γI ⇔ G(γF ) < 
G(γI ).  This is both because formal firms must pay severance payments and because sector 
productivity is higher if producing formally. 
Determination of Wages 
  Wages are set by each firm-worker pair before the match-quality is realized.  Wages are 
set according to Nash-bargaining, where each side has the same bargaining power.  Thus, formal 
and informal firms split their surplus equally with workers, as follows: 
JF
e – VF – G(γF )C  = EF
e – U, 
JI
e – VI  = EI





e are the expected discounted profits of a formal and informal job and 
the expected lifetime utilities of a formal and an informal worker, respectively, and U is the 
expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker.  The asset equations of employed and 
unemployed workers are given by, 
r Es
e = ws + λ ( U – Es
e ), 
r U = θq(θ) ( E
e - U ). 
Where E
e is the expected lifetime utility of employment for an unemployed job-seeker.  Since an 
unemployed worker is uncertain about whether he will be hired in a formal or an informal job, 
his expected utility of employment is: 
E
e = Pr(formal offer) [ ( 1 - G(γF ) ) EF
e + G(γF ) C ] + Pr(informal offer) ( 1 - G(γI ) ) EI
e.   16
Solving for ( Es
e – U ) in each sector and substituting into the equal split equation above 
determines the wages in each sector: 
wF ={ ( r + λF )( r + θq(θ) ) [ ÇγAg(γ)dγ – G(γF )C ] + r( r + λF + q(θ) )θq(θ)E
e } / 
 { ( 2( r + λF )+q(θ) ) )( r + θq(θ) ) }, 
 
wI = {( r + λI )( r + θq(θ) )[ÇγAg(γ)dγ + r( r + λI + q(θ) )θq(θ) E
e } / 
 { ( 2( r+λI )+ q(θ) ) )( r + θq(θ) ) }. 
 
Wages are expected to be higher in the formal sector because of the higher sector-productivity in 
formal jobs.  However, as shown above, in equilibrium the average match-quality is lower in 
formal sector firms, as firms in this sector are more likely to keep less productive matches than 
informal firms.   Hence, the lower quality of the matches in the formal sector lowers the expected 
wage in the formal sector.  In addition, wages are affected not only by average productivity but 
also by the level of the firing cost.  Both formal and informal wages are raised by the presence of 
state-mandated severance pay, because the severance payment raises workers’ reservation 
wages. 
Sorting into Sectors 
Given dismissal choices and wages, firms choose whether to sort into the formal or the 
informal sector.  The benefit of producing formally is that the productivity of this sector is 
higher, but the cost of producing in this sector relative to the informal sector is the payment of 
state-mandated severance in the event of a dismissal.  As firms are heterogeneous, firms may 
split between the two sectors.  Firms produce formally if the difference between the expected 
stream of profits of formal and informal firms is positive, i.e., if [ JF
e – JI
e ] > 0, and they produce 
informally if it is negative, i.e., if [ JF
e – JI
e ] < 0.  As the firm-specific productivity increases, the 
output gains in the formal sector relative to the informal sector increase.  Thus, the gains from   17
going into the formal sector are greater for more productive firms than for less productive ones: 
d[ JF
e–JI
e ] / dA = Çγ∈[γF,γ]  [ γ / (r + λF + q(θ)) ]g(γ)dγ + Çγ∈[γI,γ] [ aγ / (r + λI + q(θ)) ]g(γ)dγ > 0. 
Firms with A∈[ A, Acrit ] produce in the informal sector, while firms with A∈[ Acrit,A ] produce 
in the formal sector, where Acrit is the firm-specific productivity of the firm that is marginal 
between producing formally and producing informally.  Consequently, since formal firms are 
more productive in equilibrium, they dismiss less often and they pay higher wages than informal 
firms.
10 
C.  Severance Pay and Turnover 
The presence of state-mandated costs and higher productivity in the formal sector imply 
different hazards into and out of unemployment in the two sectors.  On the one hand, the 
probability of endogenous dismissal in the formal sector is likely to be lower than the probability 
of dismissal in the informal sector, i.e., θq(θ)(1 - F(Am))G(γF)) < θq(θ)F(Am)G(γI)).  On the 
other hand, the hiring probability will be higher or lower in the formal sector relative to the 
informal sector depending on the share of firms producing in each sector, i.e., depending on 
whether θq(θ) (1 - F(Am)) > θq(θ) F(Am) or θq(θ) (1 - F(Am)) < θq(θ) F(Am).  As the proportion 
of firms producing formally increases, then the hiring probability in the formal sector increases 
relative to the informal sector. 
Moreover, the hazards into and out of unemployment are affected directly and indirectly 
by changes in severance pay legislation.  First, a reduction in state-mandated severance pay has a 
direct effect on formal firms by increasing the threshold match-productivity that triggers 
dismissals.  Second, a reduction of severance payments pushes down wages in both sectors due 
                                                           
10 The self-sorting of more productive firms into the formal sector, thus, makes evident the problems of identifying the effect of legislation on 
turnover, simply by estimating the effect of firing cost on the hazard rates.   18
to the fall in the reservation wage.  Wages increase, however, due to the greater probability of 
dismissal in the formal sector, and the net effect on wages in both sectors is positive as well as 
the effect of wages on turnover.  Finally, a reduction of severance payments changes the 
composition of firms in each sector.  In particular, decreasing severance payments increases the 
incentives to produce in the formal sector and shifts lower productivity firms, that before were 
unwilling to produce formally, away from the informal sector.  The compositional change 
increases the dismissal and hiring rates in the formal sector due to the greater share of firms 
producing formally. 
 The direct and indirect effects of a reduction in firing costs on turnover that emerge in 
the model illustrate the problems that may arise when trying to estimate the impact of a change 
in firing costs on turnover.  First, the effects of firing costs on wages imply that the effect of 
firing costs on turnover captures not only the direct effect mentioned above, but also the indirect 
effect of firing costs on turnover going through wages.  This is not problematic in so far as one is 
interested in measuring the total effect, both direct and indirect, of firing costs on turnover.  
However, the self-sorting of firms into formal and informal sectors according to their firm-
specific productivity and the effect of the reduction of firing costs on this self-sorting are likely 
to introduce selection biases.  Finally, if a policy change occurred simultaneously with a change 
in the distribution of the shocks, then one may attribute to the reform an effect that may indeed 
be due to a worsening in the distribution of the matches.
11  The next section discusses an 
identification strategy to deal with the problem of contemporaneous changes in the distribution 
of the shocks and discusses inference given the presence of a selection problem. 
                                                           
11 In addition, a change in firing costs is also likely to affect turnover in both sectors through its indirect effect on wages.   19
V.  Identification Strategy 
A. Differences-in-differences 
The theory laid out above suggests that firing costs should only have direct effects on the 
exit rates of workers in the formal sector (covered by the legislation), but not on the exit rates of 
workers in the informal sector (uncovered by the legislation).  Hence, the firing costs should 
only have direct effects on the tenures of formal sector workers, but not on the tenures of 
workers employed in the informal sector.   Similarly, the unemployment duration of workers 
whose spells end as a result of being hired in the formal sector should be directly affected by 
firing costs, but not those of workers whose spells end as a result of being hired in the informal 
sector. Comparing the hazards into and out of unemployment (or tenures and unemployment 
spells) between formal and informal workers (covered and uncovered by the legislation) could 
then provide an estimate of the effect of firing costs on turnover.  The sample counterpart of the 
firing cost effect on tenure (unemployment spells) using differences would be: 
∆s
  = [s
 formal -s 
informal ], 
where,h
  formal = 1 /s
  f o r m a l  andh
  i n f o r m a l  = 1 /s
  i n f o r m a l  and thes’s are mean tenures 
(unemployment spells) and theh’s are mean hazard rates.
12  Considering the simplest possible 
model of tenure (unemployment duration) with no regressors, tenure (unemployment) depends 
only on a formal dummy, 
sit
  =  β +  δ Formalit + uit,   E(uitFormalit)=0. 
Given this model, it is easy to see that the difference of the mean tenures in the formal and 
informal sectors provides an estimate of the firing cost effect, δ.  This way of estimating the 
firing cost effect is, however, likely to be biased for three reasons.  First, the two groups may   20
have different characteristics and, thus, different turnover behavior and different mean tenures 
and unemployment spells.  Including regressors in the model above allows controlling for 
observable characteristics and helps to solve this problem.   Second, the error term could be 
correlated with the Formal dummy if there is self-selection into the groups, i.e., E(uitFormali=1) 
≠ E(uitFormali=0).  Finally, the two groups may be subject to different shocks and part of the 
differences in turnover patterns and, thus, tenures and unemployment spells, between the groups 
may be simply capturing these differences, i.e., βF ≠ βI. 
Exploiting the temporal change in the legislation introduced by the labor market reform 
of 1990, in addition to the variability in coverage between covered and uncovered workers, 
allows controlling for self-selection and for the difference in shocks across groups.  In the model 
of tenure (unemployment spells) with no regressors, tenure (unemployment) depends only on a 
formal dummy, on a post-reform dummy, and on an interaction term between the two, 
sit
  =  β +  δ0 Formalit + δ1 Post90it + δ2 Formalit × Post90it + uit 
First, if self-selection is constant over time, i.e., E(uipre90Formali=1) = 
E(uipost90Formali=1) and E(uipre90Formali=0) = E(uipost90Formali=0), the firing cost effect can 
be estimated by simply taking differences-in-differences: 
∆s 
gt = ∆[s 
post90 -s 
pre90 ] 





gt = 1 /s
gt.   Taking differences of average tenures (unemployment duration) for formal 
workers between the pre-1990 and the post-1990 periods provides an estimate of the firing cost 
effect and allows to difference out the biases introduced by self-selection when self-selection is 
constant over time.  Taking differences of these differences with respect to informal workers 
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(uncovered by the legislation) allows controlling for common trends that affect both groups, 
whether it is a constant trend, β, or a changing trend common to both groups, δ1. 
As indicated above, however, it is possible that the two groups are subject to different 
shocks, i.e., βF ≠ βI.  In this case, differences-in-differences would work provided that the post-
reform shocks can be adjusted using pre-reform trends.  Thus, differences-in-differences would 
work even if the trends were different in the two groups under two circumstances.  First, 
differences-in-differences would work if the trends are constant over time for each group, i.e., 
βFpre90 = βFpost90, βIpre90 = βIpost90, and δ1 = 0.  Second, differences-in-differences would also work 
if the trends change over time for each group, but the trends change by a common factor in both 
groups, i.e., βFpre90 ≠ βFpost90 = βFpre90 + δ1 and βIpre90 ≠ βIpost90 = βIpre90 + δ1.
13   
To estimate the effect of the reform on the hazard rates into and out of unemployment, 
the analogue of differences-in-differences is estimated using a formal hazard model.  I estimate 
an exponential model that controls for observables and includes, the formal dummy, the post-
1990 dummy and the interaction term between the formal and the post-1990 dummy: 
h( sit | Xit, ) = exp{ βXit + δ0 Formalit + δ1 Post90it + δ2 Formalit × Post90it }, 
where Xit is a 1 × k vector of regressors, and β is a k × 1 vector of parameters.  The vector of 
covariates Xit , includes: age, education, sex, marital status, number of dependants, the city 
where the person lives, and industry of employment. The Formal variable is included to control 
for constant differences between the groups.  Thus, δ0 is expected to be negative since the 
dismissal of formal workers is more costly than that of informal workers, both before and after 
                                                           
13 Moreover, even if trends do not change by a common factor in both groups, an unconventional differences-in-differences estimator could be 
obtained using a method proposed by Heckman and Robb (1985).   This method assumes that a pre-reform model, that is stable over time, could 
be fit for each group and then used to quantify post-reform shocks that can be inserted into equations fit to post-reform data. 
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the reform.  The Post90 dummy controls for common shocks affecting the turnover behavior of 
all workers after 1990.  Finally, the interaction term of the Formal and Post90 dummies is 
included to estimate the effect of the reduction in firing costs introduced by the reform on the 
hazard rates.  A test of the impact of the reform is equivalent to a test that the coefficient on the 
interaction term, δ2, is different from zero.  In particular, the test considers whether workers 
covered by the legislation changed their turnover behavior relative to uncovered workers after 
1990. 
B.   Potential Sources of Contamination 
The identification strategy above exploits both the temporal variability and the cross-
section variability available in the Colombian context.  Nonetheless, these differences-in-
differences estimators rely on a number of assumptions that may yield inconsistent estimates of 
the effects of firing costs on turnover.  First, the differences-in-differences estimators ignore the 
general equilibrium effects of a reduction in firing costs on composition suggested by the model 
in the previous section.  Second, the estimators rely on the assumption that trends did not change 
differentially across groups over time.  In turn, I consider the implications for the identification 
of the firing cost effect of having these two potential sources of biases. 
As highlighted by the model in the previous section, the reduction of firing costs 
introduced by the reform is likely to have generated general equilibrium effects.  In particular, 
the model above showed that a reduction in firing costs not only has direct effects on turnover by 
reducing the costs of dismissals, but it also has indirect effects on turnover through its impact on 
sector selection.  As described above, the differences-in-differences estimator above is consistent 
as long as self-selection is constant over time.  The model in the previous section showed, 
however, that a reduction in firing costs changes the incentives to sort into the formal and   23
informal sectors and generates compositional changes that also affect turnover.  Thus, a 
reduction in firing costs may itself generate compositional changes that invalidate the 
assumption of a constant self-selection rule, before and after the reform.  Yet, the model above 
does suggest that the bias introduced by differences-in-differences should be negative.  In the 
model, the reduction in firing costs induces firms with low firm-specific productivities to start 
producing formally and the reallocation between sectors thus lowers the average firm-specific 
productivity and increases turnover in both sectors.  However, the effect of this change in 
composition on turnover was shown to be greater in the informal sector.  Thus, while the firing 
cost effect obtained with differences-in-differences is inconsistent, the estimate should be a 
lower bound of the effect of the reduction in firing costs on turnover.  Moreover, the next section 
shows that the change in the size of the two sectors was small and this may indicate that the 
selection bias is unlikely to be large.  
  The second reason why the differences-in-differences estimators may yield inconsistent 
estimates of the firing cost effects is if the trends change differently over time for formal and 
informal workers.  As discussed above, an important assumption that has to be fulfilled for 
differences-in-differences to yield consistent estimates of the reform is that it eliminates the 
effect of aggregate shocks or trends on turnover.  The effect of aggregate shocks is eliminated if 
aggregate shocks are common to both groups, or if aggregate shocks are specific to each group 
but either, the shocks are constant over time or the shocks change similarly across groups. 
However, if trends are different across groups and they change differently over time, the firing 
cost effects obtained from differences-in-differences are likely to be biased.  Aside from macro 
shocks, which are common to both groups, there were two additional shocks occurring during 
this period that could have affected by turnover.  First, trade was liberalized during this period   24
and, second, a social security reform was introduced in the early 1990’s. 
  Colombia’s trade liberalization during the early 1990’s should be expected to have 
increased instability for workers employed in tradable sectors after 1990.  Nonetheless, trade 
shocks should have affected formal and informal firms alike and, hence, differences-in-
differences should control for the effect of these shocks on turnover.  If, however, formal firms 
were more likely to produce in tradable sectors and informal firms in non-tradable sectors, then 
differences-in-differences would yield upwardly biased estimates of the firing cost effect.   
Below, I estimate differences-in-differences across sectors to identify whether the changes in 
turnover were greatest in tradable sectors.  There are two reasons to believe, however, that the 
trade shocks did not generate the differences in turnover over time presented below.  First, the 
next section shows no consistent pattern across sectors in the differences-in-differences 
estimates.  In addition, differences-in-differences for different firm sizes and age groups show 
that the change in turnover was greatest for large firms and middle age workers who should have 
been affected most by the changes in job security legislation, but not by trade shocks. 
  The social security reform introduced during the early 1990’s affected formal firms but 
not informal firms.  Thus, the social security reform introduced a shock affecting formal and 
informal firms differentially over time.  As described above, the social security reform increased 
employers’ health and pension contributions and, thus, increased non-wage labor costs for firms 
complying with the legislation.  The increased variable costs should have reduced hiring and 
should have had no effect on dismissals in the formal sector relative to the informal sector.  This 
means that the social security reform should had generated very different effects on turnover   25
from those predicted by a reduction in firing costs and from those reported in the next section.
14 
Moreover, if firms adjusted to the increased non-wage labor costs by reducing wages, then the 
social security reform should not have had any turnover effects.  There is evidence that 
employers tend to pass on their non-wage costs to workers as lower wages.  For example, Gruber 
(1997) shows the sharp reduction payroll taxes that followed the privatization of Chile’s social 
security system had no employment effects because wages adjusted fully to the change in non-
wage costs.  Moreover, differences-in-differences across different firm sizes and age groups 
show that turnover changed most among larger firms and middle age workers who should had 
been affected most by the changes in job security legislation, but not by the social security 
reform. 
VI. Empirical Analysis 
This section examines the impact of the Colombian labor market reform of 1990, which 
included a substantial reduction in severance payments, on the hazard rates out of employment 
and out of unemployment of formal sector workers relative to informal sector workers. 
A. The Data 
A.1 Description 
  The data to analyze the effects of the reform on the exit rates out of employment and out 
of unemployment are drawn from the Colombian National Household Surveys (NHS) for June of 
1988, 1992, and 1996.  The June NHS’s were administered in seven metropolitan areas, 
including: Barranquilla, Bogota, Bucaramanga, Cali, Manizales, Medellin, and Pasto.  The 
benefit of using the June surveys is that these include information on informality that allows to 
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on turnover and employment.   26
separate workers between formal sector workers (covered) and informal sector workers 
(uncovered).  The June surveys allow defining workers as covered and uncovered in two ways.  
First, formal (covered) workers are defined as those workers whose employers make social 
security contributions and informal (uncovered) workers are defined as those whose employers 
do not contribute to the social security system.  This definition is a useful one, because whether 
the employer contributes or not to social security is a good proxy of whether the employer 
generally complies or not with labor legislation.   Second, formal (covered) workers are defined 
as wage-earners employed in firms with more than ten employees, and informal (uncovered) 
workers as wage-earners employed in firms with less than ten employees, family workers, 
domestic workers and the self-employed workers (excluding professionals and technicians).  As 
discussed above, employers with five or less employees, family workers, and the self-employed 
are all exempt from severance pay legislation and domestic workers and workers in firms with 
low levels of capital are entitled only to half the amount of severance pay received by other 
employees.  These surveys also include information on gender, age, marital status, educational 
attainment, number of dependents, city and sector of employment, that allows controlling for 
differences in turnover due to differences in characteristics across individuals.  In addition, the 
surveys include information about whether the worker is permanent or temporary, which allows 
distinguishing the effect that the legislative change on temporary contracts had on turnover. 
  Table 3 presents summary statistics for the covered and uncovered groups (using the two 
definitions), before and after the reform.  Columns 1 and 2 present the characteristics of formal 
(covered) workers and Columns 3 and 4 present the characteristics of informal (uncovered) 
workers, before and after the reform, respectively.  Under both definitions, covered workers have 
more education, are slightly younger, have larger families, and are more likely to be married and   27
female and to have a permanent contract than uncovered workers.  However, aside from the 
differences in educational attainment, the differences in characteristics between the two groups 
are small.  In addition, the changes in characteristics of the two groups between the pre-1990 and 
the post-1990 periods have moved in the same direction and are similar in magnitude. 
Educational attainment, average age, and the share of married workers increased in both groups 
after 1990, while the share of men, the size of households, and the share of workers with 
permanent contracts decreased in both groups after 1990. 
These summary statistics suggest that differences in composition between the groups are 
not substantial.  Nonetheless, the differences in characteristics may account for part of the 
changing turnover patterns and, thus, raw differences in turnover between covered and 
uncovered groups should be interpreted carefully.  For this reason, in the analysis below I 
estimate formal hazard models that allow controlling for individual characteristics.  The use of 
these models is, thus, crucial for identifying the firing cost effect of the labor market reform.  
Another source of compositional bias may arise if, as highlighted by the model, the composition 
of firms changes over time.  Table 3 shows an increase in the size of the formal (covered) sector 
after 1990, according to both definitions.  The percentage of workers in the formal sector 
increased from 44.84% to 51.05%, according to definition 1, and from 41.47% to 45.22% 
according to definition 2, between the pre- and post-reform periods. The increase in the size of 
the formal sector, thus, indicates the importance of controlling also for firm characteristics, as 
the composition of formal firms may have also changed.  Although the NHS’s have little 
information on firm characteristics, the hazard models below do control for industry affiliation.  
Moreover, the fact that the increase in the size of the formal sector was small and that it cannot   28
be directly attributed to the reform suggests that the selection biases described above may not be 
of great concern. 
A.2. Sampling Plan 
  The June NHS’s include information on tenure on the current job (in years) and on the 
duration of unemployment (in months) right before entering the current job that allow estimating 
hazard rates.  In particular, the survey asks currently employed workers: How long have you 
been working on your current job?, and How long were you unemployed between your current 
job and your previous job?  The data, thus, provides information on incomplete employment 
spells of currently employed workers, and on complete unemployment spells of workers who are 
currently employed and had a previous job (see graph below). 
  June Waves: 
 
  Employment Spell                                                          _________________ 
 
  Unemployment Spell  ___________________________ 
 
  ↑                                                     ↑ 
  end of previous job             end of unemployment spell-beginning of new job 
 
The stock sampling for the employment spells generates two types of biases.  First, the 
sampled employment spells are too short because of the sampling of incomplete employment 
spells.  In particular, Heckman and Singer (1985) show that under the assumptions of a time 
homogenous environment, no heterogeneity, and independence between employment and 
unemployment spells, the completed spells would be on average twice as long.  Second, as a 
consequence of sampling currently employed workers, the incomplete employment spells are   29
longer than the completed spells from a sample that follows workers flows from job-to-job over 
time.  Thus, the sampling of currently employed workers introduces length bias.  Heckman and 
Singer (1985) show, however, that under the assumptions stated above and, in addition, under 
the assumption of no duration-dependence the two biases exactly cancel out.  Below, I estimate 
exponential hazard models that impose these assumptions.  
  Similarly, the stock sampling of the unemployment spells may also introduce a number of 
biases.  Although the data provides complete unemployment spells, the fact that the spells are 
drawn from a sample of workers who are currently employed and had a previous job may 
generate biased estimates.  First, sampling currently employed workers introduces length bias.  
This is because one oversamples workers with short spells relative to long spells.  Thus, the 
mean of the sampled spells would be shorter than the mean of the spells from a flow sample.  
Second, sampling workers who had a previous job excludes all new entrants into the labor force 
and this introduces another type of length bias.  By excluding new entrants from the sample, one 
oversamples workers with long spells relative to short spells, implying that the mean of the 
sampled spells would be shorter than the mean of the spells from a flow sample.  Although, the 
distribution of unemployment spells obtained from this sampling plan is likely to be distorted, 
the bias due to stock sampling may be small in practice because the two biases have opposite 
signs and they may thus cancel out. 
B.    Tenure and Unemployment Spells, Before and After the Reform 
Average Tenure 
The model presented above indicates that the direct and indirect effects of the reduction 
in firing costs introduced by the reform should have increased the exit rates out of employment 
for formal workers relative to informal workers. The reform should have, thus, reduced the   30
average tenure of workers covered by the reform (formal workers) relative to the tenure of 
uncovered workers (informal workers).
15 
Table 4 presents the average tenure for the covered and uncovered groups (using the first 
definition), before and after the Colombian Labor Market Reform of 1990.
16  The first row 
corresponds to the average tenure after the reform, the second row corresponds to the average 
tenure prior to the reform, and the third row to the differences.  The last row provides the 
differences-in-differences estimate of the effect of the reform on tenure.  The average tenure of 
covered workers decreased after the reform from 5.6002 to 5.3130 years.  The decrease in 
average tenure for covered workers was of 3.4452 months and significantly different from zero.  
In contrast, the decrease in average tenure for uncovered workers was of 0.2112 months and not 
significantly different from zero.  The differences-in-differences estimate of the effect of the 
reform was a reduction in average tenure of 3.6612 months.  The effect is large, significantly 
different from zero, and, as predicted by the theory, most of the change comes from the reduction 
in average tenure of covered workers rather than from the increase average tenures of uncovered 
workers.  Table 5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates of the reform on average 
tenure by gender.  This table shows that most of the change in the aggregate figures is driven by 
the effect of the reform on men’s tenures.  The differences-in-differences estimate of the effect of 
the reform was a reduction of 4.1208 months for men and of 2.1012 months for women, although 
the effect is not significantly different from zero for women. 
Tables 6 and 7 present differences-in-differences estimates of the reform for different age 
and education groups.  Table 6 shows that the effect of the reform was greatest for middle age 
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increases and/or the fraction of workers with long tenures (those just fired) decreases. 
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workers.  The differences-in-differences estimate of the effect was a reduction of 4.0176 months 
for middle age workers, while the estimates for young and older workers were not significantly 
different from zero.  These results are consistent with the change in severance pay legislation and 
with the change in ‘unjust’ dismissal legislation that raised the cost of ‘unjustly’ dismissing 
workers with more than ten years of tenure.  In particular, the change in the legislation should 
have induced firms to dismiss workers just prior to completing ten years of tenure. This result is 
confirmed in the next section with the formal hazard analysis.  In contrast, Table 7 shows that 
the difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of the reform were greatest for employees 
with primary education and with a university degree or more.  This result, however, inverts in 
the formal hazard analysis that controls for changes in turnover for these groups after the reform. 
  Table 8 shows the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the reform by 
sector, to identify whether the reduction in tenures could had been the result of trade 
liberalization.  This table shows that the difference-in-differences estimates for agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, construction, and commerce are not significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels.  Moreover, the differences-in-differences estimate of the reform was a 
reduction of 6.4836 months in transportation, but only significant at the 10% level, a reduction of 
10.7028 months in financial services, only significant at the 5% level, and a reduction of 10.236 
months in services, significant at the 1% level.  Thus, the estimates by sector do not show a 
consistent pattern of changes across tradable and non-tradable sectors.  These results are 
confirmed by the formal hazard analysis presented below.  Moreover, consistent with the 
changes predicted by the labor market reform, the changes that are significant are driven by 
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reductions in the tenures of covered workers and not by the increase in tenures of uncovered 
workers. 
  Table 9 shows the differences-in-differences estimates by firm size.  The results show 
that the effects of the reform were greatest for larger firms, as predicted by the changes in the 
legislation.  The differences-in-differences estimates for the self-employed and for workers 
employed in firms with 2-5 employees and in firms with 5-10 employees are not significantly 
different from zero.  In contrast, the estimate of the effect of the reform for workers employed in 
firms with more than ten employees was a reduction of 6.3372 months.  The effect of the reform 
on workers employed by large firms is big, significantly different from zero, and driven mainly 
by a reduction of tenures of covered workers rather than by an increase of the tenures of 
uncovered workers.  This evidence is strongly consistent with the expected effects of a reduction 
in firing costs, since the self-employed and workers employed in firms with less than 5 
employees are completely exempt from severance and workers employed in firms with little 
capital are only entitled to partial severance payments. 
Unemployment Duration 
The model predicts that a reduction in dismissal costs should increase the exit rate out of 
unemployment and into formal jobs relative to the exit rate out of unemployment and into 
informal jobs.  Thus, the reduction in severance payments would be expected to shorten 
unemployment spells of workers hired into formal jobs relative to those of workers hired into 
informal jobs.
17 
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  Table 10 presents the differences-in-differences estimates of unemployment spells.
18  The 
average unemployment spell for workers whose spell ended with a formal sector job increased.  
However, the average unemployment spell of workers whose spell ended in an informal sector 
job lengthened by even more than that of formal workers.  Thus, the differences-in-differences 
estimate was a reduction in the average unemployment spell of 3.1108 weeks and significantly 
different from zero.
19  Table 11 presents the results for men and women, separately.  The 
differences-in-differences estimate for men was not significantly different from zero, but the 
effect on women was a shortening of the average unemployment spell of 7.9672 weeks and 
significant at the 1% level.  Table 12 presents the differences-in-differences estimates for 
different age groups and Table 13 presents the differences-in-differences estimates for different 
education groups.  The results show that unemployment spells decreased most for young and 
middle aged workers.  This result is consistent with the expectation that a decrease in firing costs 
should increase hiring, especially for outsiders, and is also confirmed in the formal hazard 
analysis below.  Moreover, Table 13 shows that the differences-in-differences estimates are 
greatest for workers with incomplete secondary and incomplete university education.  Thus, the 
firing cost effect on hiring appears to be greater on workers that are risky hires.  This is also 
confirmed below by the formal hazard analysis. 
  Table 14 presents the differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of the reform on 
unemployment spells by industry.  The differences-in-differences estimates are not significantly 
different from zero in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, transportation, 
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19 Contrary to the results for tenure, the differences-in-differences results for unemployment spells are driven mainly by the lengthening of the 
spells of those exiting into the informal sector.  This is however, consistent with the model presented above.  On the one hand, the model predicts 
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and financial services.  Only the effect on commerce and services are significantly different from 
zero.  The differences-in-differences estimate of the effect of the reform was a reduction of 
1.2746 weeks of the unemployment spell in commerce, but only significant at the 5% level and a 
reduction of 1.3126 weeks of the unemployment spell in services, significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, as for tenure, the results do not show a consistent pattern of a differential impact on 
tradable and non-tradable sectors.  In contrast, the differences-in-differences estimates by firm 
size in Table 15 provide some evidence that the firing cost effect was greatest among larger 
firms.  In particular, the differences-in-differences estimates of the reform on firms with 5 –10 
employees and on firms with more than ten employees indicate reductions of the average 
unemployment spell of 0.8038 weeks and of 0.2913 weeks, respectively.  Although neither effect 
is significant at conventional levels, the p-values for the differences-in-differences estimates of 
larger firms are greater than the p-values for the estimates of the self-employed and of firms with 
2-5 employees. 
C. Employment and Unemployment Survivor Functions, Before and After the Reform 
While the previous section presented the implied effects of the reform on tenure and 
unemployment spells, this section presents evidence on the effects of the reform on the survival 
probabilities in employment and unemployment.  If the reduction of dismissal costs introduced 
by the reform, indeed, was important, then the probability of survival in a formal job should had 
fallen after the reform relative to the probability of survival in an informal job.  In addition, if the 
reduction in dismissal costs generated more hiring, then the probability of survival in 
unemployment should had fallen after the reform for workers exiting into formal jobs relative to 
those exiting into informal jobs.   35
Figure 1 presents the Kaplan Meier survival estimates for employment.  This figure 
includes the probabilities of survival for formal and informal workers before and after the 
reform. The figure shows that the probability that a formal job lasts more than two years 
decreased after the reform.  For tenures of more than two years, the survivor function of formal 
workers after the reform (Formal/Post-1990) shifts down with respect to the survivor function of 
formal workers before the reform (Formal/Pre-1990).  However, for tenures of less than two 
years, the survivor function of formal workers after the reform shifted up with respect to the 
survivor function of formal workers before the reform.  That survivor function is greater for 
formal workers with less than two years of tenure after the reform is surprising, given the 
extension by the reform of the use of temporary contracts for less than a year.  However, this 
shift in the survivor function for those with less than two years of tenure may simply reflect the 
greater hiring of new permanent workers after the reform, as is shown below in the estimation of 
formal hazard models.  The downward shift of the survivor function of formal workers after the 
reform is consistent with the reduction in dismissal costs for formal firms after the reform. In 
contrast, however, Figure 1 shows, that the probability of survival increased slightly for informal 
workers after the reform relative to informal workers prior to the reform.  The survivor function 
of uncovered workers after the reform (Informal/Post-1990) shifted up slightly with respect to 
the survivor function of uncovered workers before the reform (Informal/Pre-1990).  If common 
shocks to both groups were responsible for the decreased probability of survival of formal jobs, 
then the figure should also show a downward shift of the survivor function for informal workers. 
 Moreover, consistent with the fact that formal workers are covered by job security regulations 
while informal workers are not, the survivor functions for formal workers are higher than the 
survivor functions of informal workers both before and after the reform.  The survivor functions   36
for the covered and uncovered groups, as well as the shifts of the survivor functions for each 
group after the reform, are, thus, consistent with the predicted effects of firing costs and with the 
predicted effects of the reform on formal turnover. 
  Standard Kaplan-Meier survival functions of unemployment show a similar change after 
the reform.  Figure 2 shows that the unemployment survival functions of formal hires shifted 
down between the pre-reform (Formal/Pre-1990) and post-reform (Formal/Post-1990) periods.  
Thus, for every unemployment spell of duration t, the probability of remaining unemployed 
decreased after the reform for those who exited into formal employment.  On the contrary, 
Figure 2 shows that the unemployment survival functions increased slightly for informal 
workers, after the reform. These shifts are consistent with the expected effects of the reform.  
The reduction of firing costs would have predicted that the probability of remaining unemployed 
at every time t should have decreased for workers covered by the reform but not for uncovered 
workers.  Moreover, the next section shows, that the escape rates into and out of unemployment 
increased for formal workers relative to informal workers, even after controlling for observable 
characteristics. 
D. Formal Hazard Models 
It is possible that the employment and unemployment spells and the survivor functions 
presented above changed after the reform due to changes in the characteristics of workers and 
jobs after 1990.  Thus, below I estimate formal duration models that allow controlling for the 
effects of changes in worker and job characteristics on exit hazard rates. 
As described in Section IV, I estimate exponential hazard models that control for age, 
education, marital status, city, industry of employment, and the number of dependents.  More 
importantly, these formal hazard models can capture the effects of the reform.  The models   37
include a Formal dummy that controls for differential turnover patterns across groups, a Post90 
dummy that captures the differential turnover pattern in turnover after 1990 for all groups, and 
an interaction term of the Formal and Post90 dummies that captures the effect of the reform.  In 
particular, the coefficient of the interaction term can be interpreted as the differential hazard 
rates of covered workers after the reform was introduced.  Moreover, to further probe the 
importance of the reform, other specifications of the model are included to test whether the 
effects of the reform showed the expected patterns for different groups.  In addition, to test the 
importance of trade shocks, a specification of the model that includes interaction terms of the 
Formal × Post90 dummy with sector dummies is also estimated. 
Table 16 shows the results of the estimation of exponential exit hazard rates out of 
employment.  Column (1) presents the estimates obtained from the basic specification of the 
model that includes the covariates mentioned above, the Formal dummy, the Post90 dummy, and 
the interaction term of the two.  The results show the expected signs.  The hazards are higher for 
younger, more educated, female, and single workers and for workers with smaller number of 
dependents.  The results also show that the hazards out of employment decreased during the 
post-1990 period for informal workers.  Moreover, as expected, formal workers, who are covered 
by the legislation, have lower hazards out of employment than do informal workers.  Most 
importantly, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level.  In 
particular, the coefficient indicates that, after the reform, covered workers are 6.17% more likely 
to exit employment than are uncovered workers.  This result, thus, suggests that the reduction in 
firing costs introduced by the reform increased the exit rates out of employment substantially. 
Exit hazards out of employment are likely to have increased after the reform both because of the   38
increase in dismissals and because of the increase in quits resulting from greater hiring after the 
reform. 
Another essential feature of the reform was the greater flexibility in the use of temporary 
(fixed-term) contracts and, thus, one may suspect that a great deal of the increases in turnover 
after the reform may simply be the result of increased hiring of temporary workers in the formal 
sector.  The specification in Column (2) allows to distinguish whether the increase in the exit 
rates out of employment was purely the result of the increase in the use of temporary contracts or 
if the reduction in the cost of firing permanent workers also played a role.  Column (2) in Table 
16 presents the estimates of a model including, a permanent dummy, an interaction term of the 
Post90 dummy and the permanent dummy, an interaction term of the Formal dummy and the 
Permanent dummy, and an interaction of the Formal × Post90 dummy with the Permanent 
dummy.
20  All the coefficients have the same signs as before and the coefficient on the 
Permanent dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, as expected.  The results show that 
the coefficient on the Formal × Post90 interaction is positive, but the interaction term of the 
Formal × Post90 dummy with the Permanent dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
The results indicate that, after the reform, the probability of exiting employment was 6.7% 
higher for temporary workers in the formal sector than for temporary workers in the uncovered 
sector.  At the same time, the probability of exiting employment was 6.1% higher for permanent 
worker in the formal sector than for permanent workers in the uncovered sector after the reform. 
 Thus, while the introduction of temporary contracts does appear to explain part of the increased 
turnover of formal workers, the results also suggest that the reduction of dismissal costs for 
permanent workers also contributed to increasing turnover.   39
Column (3) in Table 16 presents the results of specifications including interaction terms 
of the reform effect with the age and education variables.  This specification of the model allows 
seeing whether the impact of the reform was greater on the groups that would be expected to be 
affected most by the changes in the legislation.  First, since the reform increased the costs of 
dismissing workers with more than ten years of tenure, then the impact of the reform would be 
expected to be greater for groups with less than ten years of tenure (i.e., younger workers). 
Second, the special contracts introduced by the reform, which exempted workers with more than 
ten times the minimum wage from severance payments, would be expected to affect mostly the 
turnover of highly educated workers who are likely to earn more than ten times the minimum 
wage.  Column (3) shows that, indeed, the hazard rates of younger and middle-aged workers 
increased by more than the hazards of older workers.  Young workers with secondary education 
hired in the formal sector were 4.1% more likely to exit employment than did younger informal 
workers with secondary education after the reform.  Similarly, middle-aged formal workers with 
secondary education were 7.9% more likely to exit employment than did middle-aged informal 
workers with secondary education after the reform.  The smallest impact of the reform was on 
older formal workers, who were only 1.8% more likely to exit employment than did older 
informal workers after the reform.  These results are thus consistent with lower expected 
dismissals of workers with more than ten years of tenure.  Moreover, the results also indicate that 
the impact of the reform was greater on more educated workers who are more likely to have 
benefited from the use of “Integral Salary” contracts.  The exit rate of middle-aged formal 
workers with a primary education increased by 6.6% after the reform relative to middle-aged 
informal workers with the same level of education.  The exit rate of middle-aged formal workers 
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with secondary, a high school degree and university education increased by 7.9%, 12.5%, and 
13.1% after the reform relative to middle-aged informal workers with the same levels of 
education.  In contrast, the hazard out of employment increased only by 3.8% for middle-aged 
formal workers with more than a university degree after the reform relative to middle-aged 
informal workers with the highest educational attainment.  The impact was, thus, smallest among 
the least and the most educated.  The small impact on these groups may be due to the fact that 
these workers have longer tenures and, thus, are more likely to have been affected by the 
increase in the costs of  ‘unjust’ dismissals for tenures of more than ten years. 
While the above patterns are consistent with the effects of the labor market reform on 
different groups, it may be that part of the increased turnover is the result of trade shocks 
affecting various groups differently.  Column (4) in Table 16 presents the results from an 
exponential hazard model that includes interaction terms of the Formal × Post90 dummy with 
sector dummies.  The idea is that if trade liberalization were responsible for the increased 
turnover after the labor market reform, then the observed impact would be greater on workers 
employed in tradable sectors than on those employed in non-tradable sectors.  The results from 
Column (4) in Table 16 show that the increase in turnover of covered workers after the reform 
was greater in utilities, transportation, construction and services.  The probability of exiting 
formal employment in these sectors after the reform was 640%, 15.7%, 12.3%, and 17.6% 
greater than the probability of exiting informal employment in these sectors.  However, if the 
trade shocks were a main source of the increased turnover, it would be expected that the exit rate 
out of employment would had increased more for workers hired in trade-intensive sectors such 
as commerce and manufacturing.  In fact, after the reform formal workers in commerce were 
only 2.5% more likely to exit employment than informal workers in this sector were.  Moreover,   41
the probability of exiting employment was 1% lower after the reform for formal workers relative 
to informal workers hired in manufacturing.  The results from the exponential hazard model, 
thus, do not provide any reason to believe that trade liberalization increased turnover for covered 
workers after 1990. 
Table 17 includes the results of exponential hazards out of unemployment.  Given the 
reduction of mandated firing costs, one would expect greater hiring in the covered sector and, 
thus, an increase in the escape rate out of unemployment for workers hired into formal sector 
jobs.  Column (1) shows that, indeed, the exit hazard out of unemployment increased by 5.75% 
for covered workers after the reform relative to uncovered workers.
21  Moreover, while the 
extension of temporary contracts appears to explain part of the increased hiring, most of the 
increase in the exit hazards out of unemployment is due to the increased hazards into permanent 
jobs in the formal sector.  The results from Column (2) in Table 17 show that the escape rate out 
of unemployment increased by 4% for formal temporary workers after the reform relative to 
temporary informal workers.  However, the exit rate out of unemployment increased by even 
more for formal permanent workers after the reform, thus indicating that the reduction in 
dismissal costs of permanent workers did increase the incentives to hire this type of workers.  
The results show that the probability of exiting unemployment and entering a formal permanent 
job increased by 6.1% after the reform relative to the probability of entering an informal 
permanent job.
22 
Column (3) in Table 17 presents the results of the exponential hazard model including 
interaction terms of the reform effect with the age and education variables.  The estimates from 
                                                           
21 The sign on the formal dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level.  This could be explained if unsuccessful discouraged workers who 
get tired of searching for formal work turned to the informal sector as a last resource.   42
this model show that, as for the hazards out of employment, the impact of the reform was greater 
on younger and more educated workers.  The reform should have had greater effects on the exit 
rates out of unemployment for younger workers if the reduction in dismissal costs decreased the 
power of insiders and induced more hiring of young outsiders.  In fact, the exit rate out of 
unemployment and into formal jobs for young workers increased by 25.8% after the reform 
relative to the exit rate into informal jobs.  The exit rate into formal jobs for middle-aged 
workers also increased after the reform but not by as much.  In particular, the hazard rate out of 
unemployment and into formal jobs increased by 3.9% for middle-aged workers relative to 
informal workers.  In contrast, the hazard rates out of unemployment and into formal jobs 
decreased by 11.1% for older workers after the reform, relative to those entering informal jobs.  
In addition, these results show that the impact of the reform on exit hazard rates out 
unemployment was greatest on the more educated.  This is to be expected, given that these 
workers are the ones more likely to opt for the “Integral Salary” contract that exempts workers 
from severance and other dismissal costs.  In fact, the hazards out of unemployment and into 
formal jobs decreased after the reform by 10% relative to the hazard out of unemployment and 
into informal jobs for workers with primary education and by 3.9% and 1.2% for workers with 
secondary schooling and a high school degree, respectively.  In contrast, after the reform, the 
exit rates out of unemployment and into formal jobs increased by 37% for university graduates 
and by 12% for workers with more than a university degree relative to the exit rates into 
informal jobs. 
Finally, Column (4) in Table 17 shows the results of the hazard model with sector 
dummy and reform interactions.  The results show that the increase in the exit rates out of 
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unemployment after the reform was greater for workers exiting into formal sector jobs in mining, 
utilities, and services.  The probability of exiting unemployment into formal employment in 
these sectors after the reform was 45.7%, 27.6%, and 10.9% greater than the probability of 
exiting unemployment into informal employment in these sectors.  However, the probability of 
exiting unemployment into formal employment in trade-intensive sectors such as commerce and 
manufacturing was only 2.8% and 6.7% higher than the probability of exiting unemployment 
into informal employment in these sectors.  As the results from the employment hazard models, 
these results from the unemployment hazard model, thus, do not provide evidence indicating the 
importance of trade liberalization in increasing worker turnover after 1990.  Instead, the 
increased hazards in utilities and services, which are more likely to be public sector jobs covered 
by the legislation, indicates to the importance of the labor market reform in generating these 
patterns in turnover. 
VII. Worker Turnover and Unemployment 
The previous section showed that the functioning of labor markets changed substantially 
in Colombia after the introduction of the labor market reform of 1990.  In particular, the 
estimates from the formal hazards show that, after controlling for observable characteristics, the 
post-reform period was characterized by higher exit rates into and out of unemployment in the 
formal sector relative to the informal sector. 
While the results in the previous section indicate that the reform increased labor market 
flexibility by increasing the flows into and out of unemployment, the net effects of the reform on 
employment and unemployment are ambiguous.  In this section, I use the steady state condition 
of the model in Section IV, together with the hazard rate results obtained in Section VI, to obtain 
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a rough estimate of the net effect of the reform on unemployment.   
In the model above, a steady state condition has to be satisfied such that the flow into 
unemployment from both sectors must equal the flow out of unemployment and into both 
sectors: 
λFeF + θq(θ)(1-F(Am))G(γF))u + λIeI + θq(θ)F(Am)G(γI)u = θq(θ)(1-F(Am))u + θq(θ)F(Am)u. 
Substituting for employment in each sector, eF = (1-F(Am))e and eI = F(Am)e, and for the 
identity, e + u =1, and solving for u yields the following formula for the unemployment rate, 
u = [(1-F(Am))λF + F(Am)λI] / 
[(1-F(Am))λF + F(Am)λI + (1-F(Am))θq(θ)(1-G(γF)) + F(Am)θq(θ)(1-G(γI))]. 
 
The unemployment rate can be estimated from this equation by substituting for the average 
hazard rates into and out of unemployment during the pre-reform period and the shares in each 
sector.   The average hazard rates are estimated with the average tenure and unemployment 
spells in Tables 4 and 10, which indicate an average tenure of 67.2 and 54.2 months in the formal 
and informal sectors and average unemployment spells of 1.8 and 2.2 months in the formal and 
informal sectors during the pre-reform period.  The shares of formal and informal employment 
are reported in Table 1.  Before the reform, the shares of formal and informal employment were 
0.45 and 0.55, respectively.  After the reform, the shares of formal and informal employment 
changed to 0.51 and 0.49, respectively.  Finally, Tables 16 and 17 show an increase in the 
hazards into an out of unemployment of 6.17% and 5.75%. 
As the model abstracts from many factors affecting labor markets, the estimated 
unemployment obtained from the formula above should not be interpreted as precise estimates of 
the unemployment rate, but rather as an indication of the magnitude of the changes in 
unemployment rates between the two periods.  For example, taking into account other flows such   45
as retirements, new entries into the labor market, and deaths, the unemployment rate is: 
u = [ ξ + ψ + σ + (1-F(Am))λF + F(Am)λI] / 
[ ξ + ψ + σ + (1-F(Am))λF + F(Am)λI + (1-F(Am))θq(θ)(1-G(γF)) + F(Am)θq(θ)(1-G(γI))], 
 
where ξ, ψ, and σ are the flows due to retirements, new entries, and deaths, which are estimated 
assuming a working life of 35 years, entry at 18 years of age, and a life expectancy of 60 years 
for those that die before retiring.   
The unemployment rate for the pre-reform period obtained with this formula is 4.84%, 
which is lower than the true unemployment rate of 11.8% in Colombia in 1988.  The post-reform 
unemployment rate estimated with the post-reform shares is 4.69%, which is also a lower than 
the true unemployment in 1992 and 1996, 10.2% and 10%, respectively.  These results suggest a 
reduction in unemployment of 0.15% points between the pre- and post-reform periods, compared 
to the actual reduction in unemployment of 1.6% between 1988 and 1992 and of 1.8% between 
1988 and 1996.  These results suggest the reform contributed to about 10% of the reduction in 
the unemployment rate between the pre- and post-reform periods. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The Colombian labor market reform of 1990 provides an interesting quasi-experiment to 
analyze the effects of a reduction in firing costs.  This study exploited the temporal change in the 
legislation together with the difference in coverage between formal and informal workers to 
analyze the impact of the reform on worker turnover.  The differences-in-differences estimates 
indicate that the reform increased the dynamism of the Colombian labor market, by increasing 
the exit rates into and out of unemployment.  Moreover, aside from contributing to increase 
mobility in the labor market, the reform is also likely to have contributed to increase compliance 
with labor legislation by lowering the costs of formal production.  The increased churning in the   46
labor market and the greater compliance with the legislation are estimated to have contributed to 
about 10% of the reduction in the unemployment rate from the late 1980’s to the early 1990’s.  
At the same time, the reform is likely to explain in part the recent surge in the unemployment 
rate during the late 1990’s.  This is because the greater flexibility in hiring and firing after the 
reform is likely to translate in increased hiring relative to firing during expansions but in 
increased firings relative to hiring during recessions. 
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                                  Table 1: Indemnities for ‘Unjust’ Dismissal by Tenure 
 





  Less than a Year  ≥1 and <5 years  ≥5 and <10 years ≥10 years  ≥10 years 
          
Dismissal     
Costs  45 days  45 days and 15   45 days and 20   45 days and 30   45 days and 40 
   Additional days  additional days  additional days  additional days 
   After the first 
year. 
 
After the first 
year. 
after the first 
year. 






Table 2: Advance Notice Requirements by Firm Size 
 
Firm Size  Threshold for Advance 
Notification of Collective 
Dismissals 
 
>10 and <50 employees  30% of the workforce 
≥50 and <100 employees  20% of the workforce 
≥100 and <200 employees  15% of the workforce 
≥200 and <500 employees  9% of the workforce 
≥500 and <1,000 employees  7% of the workforce 








   51
 
Table 3: Basic Characteristics of Formal and Informal Workers, 
Before and After the Reform 
 
        
  Formal Informal 
 
 Pre-reform  Post-reform  Pre-reform  Post-reform 
Definition 1 of 
Informality 
      






55.16 %  48.95 % 
Share of Permanent 
Workers 
90.66% 88.84%  77.64%  74.5% 
Share of Men 
 
68.69 %  64.95 %  69.6 %  67.56 % 
Share of Married 
Workers 
69.79 %  73.38 %  68.1 %  72.17 % 
Average Education 
 
8.9 years  9.74 years  6.1 years  6.67 years 
Average Age 
 
35.52 years  35.87 years  36.01 years  36.54 years 
Average No. of 
Dependants 




      
Share of Total 
Employment 
41.47% 45.22%  58.63%  54.78% 
Share of Permanent 
Workers 
86.6% 84.95%  81.27%  79.24% 
Share of Men 
 
70.53% 66.8%  68.24%  65.75% 
Share of Married 
Workers 
69.71% 72.43%  68.39%  73.09% 
Average Education 
 
8.93 years  9.79 years  6.29 years  6.95 years 
Average Age 
 
34.7 years  35.02 years  36.57 years  37.17 years 
Average No. of 
Dependants 
0.84 persons  0.77 persons  0.78 persons  0.73 persons 
        
 
Notes: the table reports proportions and means of the variables in the formal and informal sectors before and after the reform using two alternative 
definitions of informality.  The proportions and means using the first definition are presented in the top panel, while those using the second definition 
are presented in the bottom panel.  Under definition 1, workers are defined as those whose employers pay social security taxes and informal workers 
are those whose employer does not pay social security contributions.  Under definition 2, formal workers are defined as wage-earners employed by 
firms with more than 10 employees and informal workers are wage-earners employed by firms with less than 10 employees, family workers, domestic 
workers, and self-employed workers.   In Colombia, family workers, self-employed, and workers employed by firms with less than 5 employees are 
completely exempt from severance pay legislation, while domestic workers and workers employed by firms with little capital are subject to half the 
severance payments of workers completely covered by the legislation.   52
 
Table 4: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 




 Formal  Informal 
    






















Table 5: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Tenure, by Gender 
 










        



























        
Differences-in-Differences  -0.3434
*  (0.1416) -0.1751
  (0.1594) 
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Table 6: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Tenure, by Age Group 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
 
Formal Informal 
        
























         















         
Diff’s-in-diff’s 
 
0.0023 (0.0684)  -0.3348
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Table 7: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Tenure, by Education Group 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
 
Formal Informal 
        














































*  (0.2111) -0.0720
  (0.1867) -0.1685  (0.2380) 
 




        


























      
Diff’s-in-diff’s 
 
-0.2368 (0.4018)  -0.4133 (0.4923) 
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Table 8: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Tenure, by Industry 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
 
Formal Informal 
        














































  (1.0964) 0.6931
  (1.3608) 0.3595
  (0.2341) 
  
                               Utilities  Construction  Commerce 
 
        




































         
Diff’s-in-diff’s 
 




  (0.2046) 
 
                                     Transportation  Financial Services  Services 
 
        















































†  (0.4009) -0.8919
**  (0.4961) -0.8530
*  (0.2189) 
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Table 9: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Tenure, by Firm Size 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
       
















      











      
Diff’s-in-diff’s 
 
-0.2718 (0.3734) -0.1377  (0.2514) 
 
                                Firms 5-10 employees  Firms > 10 employees 
 
       
















      














*  (0.2134) 
 
 
   57
  
Table 10: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 




 Formal  Informal 
    
















Differences-in-Differences  -  0.7777
*   





Table 11: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Unemployment Duration, by Gender 
 










        




























        
Differences-in-Differences  -0.1713
  (0.2925) -1.9918
*  (0.6592) 
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Table 12: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Unemployment Duration, by Age Group 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
 
Formal Informal 
        
























         





















**  (0.4184) -0.7688
*  (0.3481) 0.9037  (0.1396) 
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Table 13: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Unemployment Duration, by Education Group 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
 
Formal Informal 
        















































  (0.5224) -0.5263
*  (0.5560) 0.4520  (0.7431) 
 
                                     University Education  University Degree  
or more 
 
        
































*  (1.2379) -0.2619 (1.1239) 
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Table 14: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Unemployment Duration, by Industry 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
 
Formal Informal 
        














































  (2.0497) 0.4153
  (3.2289) -0.4866  (0.6275) 
  
                               Utilities  Construction  Commerce 
 
        















































  (6.2663) -0.1794
  (0.7816) -1.2746
**  (0.6425) 
 
                                     Transportation  Financial Services  Services 
 
        














































  (0.8679) -0.7470
  (1.1993) -1.3126
*  (0.5924) 
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Table 15: Sample Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of 
the Reform on Average Unemployment Duration, by Firm Size 
 




Informal Formal Informal 
       





























      
Diff’s-in-diff’s 
 
-0.2490 (1.0863) 0.6328  (0.7099) 
 
                                Firms 5-10 employees  Firms > 10 employees 
 
       
















      










      
Diff’s-in-diff’s 
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Table 16: Exponential Hazard Model Estimates of Employment Duration
 ( n = 55,683 ) 
 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 


































Post90 × Permanent  - 0.0268 
(0.0026) 
- - 





Formal × Post90 × 
Age 25-55 years 
- -  0.0359 
(0.0029) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
Age > 55 years 
- -  -0.0222 
(0.0049) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
Secondary Educ. 
- -  0.0124 
(0.0031) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
High-School Degr. 
- -  0.0538 
(0.0035) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
University Educ. 
- -  0.0596 
(0.0035) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
University Degr. 
- -  -0.0254 
(0.0054) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
Mining 
- - -  -0.4799 
(0.0281) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Manufacturing 
- - -  -0.0321 
(0.0133) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Utilities 
- - -  1.9788 
(0.0661) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Construction 
- - -  0.0867 
(0.0143) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Commerce 
- - -  -0.0033 
(0.0133) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Transportation 
- - -  0.1178 
(0.0141) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Financial Services 
- - -  0.1339 
(0.0144) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Services 
- - -  0.0367 
(0.0133) 
Log-likelihood -12,256,412  -12,131,391  -12,157,990  -12,240,447 
 
Notes: the table reports changes in the employment hazard estimate with exponential hazard models.  The models 
include: three age dummies, five education dummies, dummies for sex and marital status, number of dependents, nine 
industry dummies, and six city dummies.  Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 17: Exponential hazard models of unemployment duration
 ( n = 55,683 ) 
 

























Permanent -  0.2676 
(0.0022) 
- - 





Post90 × Permanent  - -0.0092 
(0.0026) 
- - 





Formal × Post90 × 
Age 25-55 years 
- -  -0.1908 
(0.0041) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
Age > 55 years 
- -  -0.3479 
(0.0066) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
Secondary Educ. 
- -  0.1468 
(0.0041) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
High School Degr. 
- -  0.1195 
(0.0047) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
University Educ. 
- -  0.4229 
(0.0072) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
University Degr. 
- -  0.2184 
(0.0066) 
- 
Formal × Post90 × 
Mining 
- - -  0.0493 
(0.0282) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Manufacturing 
- - -  -0.2995 
(0.0135) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Utilities 
- - -  -0.0830 
(0.0661) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Construction 
- - -  -0.3426 
(0.0145) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Commerce 
- - -  -0.2617 
(0.0134) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Transportation 
- - -  -0.2872 
(0.0142) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Financial Services 
- - -  -0.3947 
(0.0146) 
Formal × Post90 × 
Services 
- - -  -0.2237 
(0.0134) 
Log-likelihood -  17,671,211  -17,613,645  -17,639,878  -17,643,799 
 
Notes: the table reports changes in the unemployment hazard estimated with exponential hazard models.  The models 
include: three age dummies, five education dummies, dummies for sex and marital status, number of dependents, nine 
industry dummies, and six city dummies.  Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthesis. Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Employment Survival Estimates,
by Period and Coverage
Tenure









Formal/Post-1990Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Unemployment Survival Estimates,
by Period and Coverage
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